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Partisan Realignment in Cape Town, 
1994-2004 
Abstract 
The Western Cape is the one part of South Africa that has experienced strong 
competition in democratic elections and a dramatic shift in power between 
political parties.  Between 1994 and 2004 the initially dominant National Party 
lost almost all of its support, whilst support rose steadily for the African 
National Congress.  Neither voting patterns nor shifts in the Western Cape fit 
neatly with a simple racial explanation of voting behaviour, because of both the 
heterogeneity and supposed fluidity of the ‘coloured vote’.  First, coloured 
voters have voted for opposing parties.  Secondly, it has been asserted widely 
that there was a swing among coloured voters from the National Party to the 
African National Congress.  This paper explores ward-level election results and 
survey data on Cape Town to show that coloured voters continue to be 
heterogeneous in their voting behaviour but that there is little evidence that 
former National Party supporters have become ANC supporters.  The major 
cause of shifting partisan power in Cape Town is not voter realignment, but 
rather demographic change, with differential turnout playing a role in specific 
elections.  It is the overall electorate, rather than the individual voter, that has 
changed. 
Introduction 
In South Africa as a whole, successive elections since 1994 have returned 
almost identical results.  The share of the vote won by the African National 
Congress (ANC) has risen very slightly whilst the opposition parties have failed 
collectively to make any inroads on its support.  South Africa seems to have a 
dominant party system, with little real competition for the popular vote (Lodge 
1999, 2002; Reynolds, 1999; Southall, 2001; Piombo and Nijzink, 2005). 
In one province, however, not only has there been fierce electoral competition 
but there has also been a striking shift in political power.  The Western Cape is 
not a historic area of ANC strength, and in the first democratic elections in 
1994, the ANC won just one-third of the vote in the province – approximately 
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the same share that it won in KwaZulu-Natal and less than its share in each of 
the other seven provinces in South Africa.  The largest share (53 percent) of the 
1994 vote in the Western Cape was won by the National Party (NP), so the 
province had from 1994 a National Party provincial government and premier.  
Just ten years later, however, the picture was very different.  In 2004, in the 
third democratic elections, the ANC won 46 percent of the provincial vote, 
against just 9 percent for the by now “New” National Party (NNP).  ANC 
leaders served as provincial premier (Ebrahim Rasool) and Mayor of Cape 
Town (Noma-India Mfeketo).   
The shift in power from the NP to the ANC was fast but steady.  Table 1 
summarises the votes won in the Western Cape by the major parties in each 
provincial and local election between 1994 and 2004.  The ANC’s share of the 
vote rose from 33 percent in the 1994 provincial election, to 37 percent in the 
local elections of 1995-96 and 42 percent in the 1999 provincial election.  The 
ANC’s share of the vote dropped slightly in the local elections of 2000, before 
resuming its upward trend again, reaching 45 percent in the 2004 provincial 
election.  The NP’s decline was even sharper than the ANC’s rise.  From 53 
percent of the vote in 1994, its share fell to 48 percent in 1995-96 and 38 
percent in 1999.  It contested the 2000 local elections as part of the newly-
formed Democratic Alliance (DA), together with the Democratic Party (DP).  In 
2004, after splitting away from the DA and forming a new alliance with the 
ANC instead, the NNP won a mere 11 percent of the vote.  




1996 local* 1999 
provincial 














DA       564 50 425 27 
DP 142 7 60 5 189 12     
NP/NNP 1138 53 564 48 610 38   170 11 
ANC 706 33 432 37 668 42 440 39 709 45 
ID         123 8 
Other 151 7 108 9 134 8 117 10 140 9 
Total 2137 100 1164 100 1601 100 1120 100 1567 100 
Notes: * PR votes    ** PR + ward votes. 
The shift in institutional power from the NP to the ANC was not achieved 
through these general provincial and local elections alone.  In the Western Cape, 
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ANC power has repeatedly benefited from institutional rules that delivered it 
power ahead of its rising share of the popular vote.  Thus, after the first post-
apartheid local elections in 1995-96, the ANC won control of a number of 
municipalities – including two major parts of Cape Town – on the basis of the 
legislative provision that former ‘black’ areas received half the wards in the new 
‘interim’ councils, even if they were home to a much smaller proportion of the 
electorate (see Seekings, 1995, 1997a).  More recently, changes in power have 
run ahead of changes in the popular vote due to defections, floor-crossing and 
shifting partisan coalitions in the provincial and local assemblies.  As the NP 
has fallen apart, so many of its provincial and municipal legislators have found 
their way into the ANC.  At the local government level, for example, the ANC 
won control of the Cape Town City Council when former NP councillors, 
elected in 2000 under the flag of the DA, crossed the floor in September 2004. 
Both the initial patterns of and post-1994 trends in electoral support have 
attracted widespread commentary in the press as well as a range of scholarly 
analyses.  Voting patterns in the 1994 election received the most detailed 
analysis, as scholars grappled with the incongruence between voting in the 
Western Cape and simple race-based explanations of voting behaviour.  In the 
country as a whole, the support base of the ANC comprised African voters, and 
the support base of the NNP comprised coloured, Indian and white voters.  This 
simple correlation gave rise to descriptions of the 1994 election as a racial 
census, to use a phrase coined by Horowitz (1985) to describe elections in other 
multi-ethnic societies.  In the Western Cape, as Reynolds (1994: 203-4) and 
many others have noted, there was a strong correlation between race and voting, 
with African citizens voting for the ANC and most white and coloured citizens 
voting for the NNP.  But the ANC did win the votes of an estimated one in four 
coloured voters (ibid: 201; Mattes et al., 1996: 145).  Indeed, as Mattes, 
Giliomee and James pointed out, none of the NP, ANC or DP had a mono-racial 
support base: the NP’s support base was (they estimate) two-thirds coloured and 
one-third white, the ANC’s almost equally African and coloured, and the DP’s 
almost equally white and coloured (Mattes et al., 1996: 146).   
Any explanation of voting patterns in the Western Cape has to confront the fact 
that there is no monolithic ‘coloured vote’.  For the ANC and NP, campaigning 
in ‘African’ and ‘white’ residential areas respectively was a matter of promoting 
turnout among their core supporters.  It was in ‘coloured’ areas that there was a 
battle for hearts and minds. This presented each of these political parties with a 
strategic dilemma: might promoting themselves in coloured areas perhaps 
undermine their turnout in their areas of core support?  A series of studies 
focused on how the ANC and NP addressed this dilemma and how coloured 
voters responded to the parties’ campaigns (Calland, 1994; Eldridge, 1996; 
Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Seekings, 1996a; Mattes et al., 1996).  The 
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overall result is clear: working-class coloured voters opted en masse for the NP 
whilst middle-class coloured voters were divided, with many supporting the 
ANC.   
In a poll in mid-1993, one half of all coloured voters in the Western Cape said 
that they did not know for which party they would vote.  In an earlier paper, I 
argued that the story of the 1994 elections in the Western Cape was essentially 
the story of the NP’s success in persuading most of these initially undecided 
coloured voters to vote for the NP (Seekings, 1996a).  Most other scholars 
writing about the election have also argued or implied that the 1994 result was 
not pre-ordained, but instead was contingent upon the campaigns run by the 
major competitors.  The NP emphasised its national leader, F.W. de Klerk, who 
enjoyed strong personal support among these voters.  The ANC’s campaign was 
characterised by mishaps that alienated coloured voters (Mattes et al., 1996: 
129-31).  Almost all voters (and parties) concurred that the key issues in the 
election were jobs and crime, and both parties ran issue-oriented campaigns, but 
the NP’s take on these issues was more appealing to undecided voters.  As I 
wrote then: 
Coloured voters might have been convinced that the ANC had an 
impressive ‘Plan’ [the Reconstruction and Development Programme] 
to build houses and provide jobs, but they seem to have remained 
skeptical that they themselves would benefit. … The NP campaign, 
on the other hand, was effective in linking voters’ fears to the spectre 
of a destructive ANC.  When African squatters occupied houses built 
for coloured families, the NP warned (coloured) voters that their 
houses were ‘not safe under the ANC’. … The NP succeeded in 
defining the way in which the issues were understood. (Seekings, 
1996a: 35; see also Eldridge and Seekings, 1996)  
Calland (1994) argues that the ANC would have done better had it adopted a 
more aggressive, and negative, campaign, focusing primarily on the long history 
of apartheid.  Mattes et al. (1996) note that it would have been difficult for the 
ANC to run a negative campaign in this province whilst running a positive 
campaign nationally.  But there are different kinds of negative campaigns: 
Eldridge and I (1996) argue that a more effective negative campaign in the 
Western Cape would have focused on the immediate issues, i.e. jobs and crime, 
but emphasising the NP’s failure to address these issues whilst holding power in 
the very recent past.   
Electoral trends after 1994 supported the general interpretation of contingent 
voting, i.e. that voting was contingent on circumstance and campaign and was 
not fixed or pre-determined.  The dominant media interpretation of the 
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apparently rising support for the ANC was that there was a ‘swing’ from the NP 
to the ANC, with individual voters defecting from the former to the latter party.  
The ANC, unsurprisingly, backed this interpretation in its public statements.  I 
contested this interpretation in a series of articles following the first post-
apartheid local government elections (Seekings, 1995, 1996b, 1997a).  My 
argument revolved primarily around data on turnout in the elections.  Between 
1994 and 1995-96, the ANC’s share of the provincial vote might have risen, but 
the absolute number of votes won in the Western Cape by the ANC actually 
declined, from 706,000 to 432,000.  The ANC’s share of the vote only rose 
because there was an even more spectacular collapse in the votes won by the 
NP, from over 1.1 million to just 564,000.  I suggested that the shift in the vote 
was the consequence of differential turnout: the ANC had a much larger core of 
strong supporters, who turned out to vote in 1995-96, whilst the NP had a small 
core of strong supporters and a large number of weak supporters, so that it was 
especially hard hit by low turnout in 1995-96.  The ‘swing’ was the result of 
voters who were undecided in mid-1993 but opted for the NP in 1994, who then 
became disproportionately apathetic in 1995-96, such that the primary ‘swing’ 
was from the NP to non-voting.  The evidence for a swing from the NP to the 
ANC was weak.  ‘Without the results of consecutive elections at the same level, 
or comparable and sound opinion poll data, we should beware strong claims 
about shifts and swings’ (Seekings, 1997a: 135). 
The results of the 1999 provincial elections were not so clear as to resolve the 
issue of voter realignment (see Table 1).  The ANC won more votes in 1999 
than it had in 1995-96, but fewer than it had in 1994.  The ANC’s share of the 
vote continued to rise not because it was winning more votes, but because the 
other parties continued to lose votes.  The DP and NP combined had won 
almost 1.3 million votes in 1994.  In 1999 they won just 799,000.  
Unfortunately, most studies of these results ignored the existing literature and 
tended simply to replicate rather than build on the findings of earlier studies.  
Jacobs (2001)1 found that the 1999 election showed that support for the NP was 
not strongly entrenched.  Like me, he suggested that there had been a clear 
swing to the ANC in small towns and among farm-workers.  Like me, he 
pointed to the importance of turnout.  Like Mattes et al., Eldridge and myself, 
and Lodge (1999), Jacobs also argued that the parties’ strategic and tactical 
                                                 
1 In his article, Jacobs claimed that the extant literature on voting among coloured South 
Africans tell us nothing about the ‘political behaviour of coloured voters’ or ‘the tactics of 
political parties that were contesting the vote’ (26).  His grasp of the literature was poor.  He 
fails to cite any of the work of Calland (1994), Eldridge (1996; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996) 
or myself (Seekings, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a).  Although he did refer to data in one article 
of mine (Seekings, 1996a), he failed to attribute the article to me and ignored the substantive 
argument contained therein.  Jacobs perhaps ignores all this previous work because he is 
distrustful of pre-1999 opinion polls, but his criticisms of those polls (p.25) are not specified. 
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choices were consequential.  The new NP leader, Martinus van Schalkwyk, was 
no vote-puller in the De Klerk mould.  The ANC, on the other hand, waged a 
more effective campaign than in 1994, addressing directly many of the concerns 
of poorer coloured voters and attacking more strongly the NP (see Lodge, 1999: 
142-6, 176-7).  The ANC also reaped the electoral benefits of having delivered 
improved living conditions in some areas.  Habib and Naidu (1999) also 
reached the very unoriginal conclusion that class as well as race played a part in 
voting behaviour, with the NNP and DP performing better in poorer coloured 
areas in the Western Cape (and, similarly, Indian areas in KwaZulu-Natal) 
whilst the ANC performed better in richer coloured (and Indian) areas. 
The results of the 2000 local elections further complicated analysis of voter 
realignment in the Western Cape.  The ANC’s number of votes dropped to 
almost the same number as in the previous local elections in 1995-96.  Its share 
(39 percent) was slightly higher than in 1995-96, but was lower than in the 1999 
provincial elections (see Table 1).  The ANC’s opponent in the 2000 local 
elections was, for the first and only time, the Democratic Alliance comprising 
the NNP and DP (and very minor allies).  The new DA won many fewer voters 
than the NNP and DP combined in 1995-96, and its share was the same as in 
1999 (but was up slightly in Cape Town).  There are, to my knowledge, no 
independent studies of the 2000 elections in the Western Cape or Cape Town 
specifically2, but Lodge’s study of the local elections countrywide includes 
some discussion of Cape Town (see especially Lodge, 2002: 104-10).  Both 
parties again pitched their campaigns at coloured voters, with the ANC selecting 
as their candidate for mayor Lynn Brown (having failed to persuade Cheryl 
Carolus, the ambassador to London, to stand) and the DA selecting Pieter 
Marais (from the NNP).  Both parties made concerted efforts to appeal to 
coloured voters.  But in the end the overall result reflected more the success of 
the DA in mobilising its supporters in white areas relative to the ANC in 
African townships, i.e. the election result hinged on turnout – as both parties 
acknowledged (Lodge, 2002: 119).  Lodge does not attempt to assess trends in 
coloured areas or among coloured voters. 
The 2004 election results seem to provide much stronger evidence for a swing 
to the ANC.  The ANC won 709,000 votes in the province, more even than it 
had in the 1994 election (see Table 1).  The ANC’s share of the vote was a full 
12 percentage points higher in 2004 than in 1994.  Its share rose dramatically 
because the total number of votes cast in the province in 2004 was much the 
same as in 1999, and way below the 1994 figure.  The opposition parties were 
more fragmented in 2004 than in 2000.  A large section of the NNP had split 
away from the DA (leaving a significant rump of former NNP members behind 
                                                 
2 ANC official Max Ozinsky wrote an insightful commentary in the ANC magazine, 
Umrabulo (Ozinsky, 2001). 
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in the DA) and entered a remarkable alliance with the ANC.  Meanwhile, 
Patricia de Lille – a coloured and high-profile member of the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) – left the fractious and moribund PAC to form a new party, the 
Independent Democrats (ID).  The results showed that the NNP was 
spectacularly unable to maintain its former support, winning just 11 percent of 
the vote, way behind the DA.  But the DA and ID were unable to attract the 
share of the vote that the NNP had once commanded.  The DA won just 27 
percent of the vote and the ID an impressive 8 percent. 
Overall, comparing the 1994 and 2004 results, it might appear that there have 
been at least two ‘swings’ in the Western Cape: from the NP to non-voting (or 
to other opposition parties), and from the opposition parties collectively to the 
ANC.  In this paper, I argue that there is still inadequate evidence to support the 
second part of this conclusion.  I suggest instead that the ANC’s vote has risen 
primarily because of the changing demographics of the electorate, with the 
ANC’s support base growing rapidly.  The ANC’s share of the vote has risen 
because of the combination of, firstly, demographic change which swelled its 
support base and, secondly, the collapse of the National Party, many of whose 
voters never swung behind any other party.  This is the case, at least, for 
metropolitan Cape Town.  In this paper, I consider only evidence for the 
metropolitan area – which does include two-thirds of the provincial electorate.  
It is likely that processes in voting behaviour in the smaller towns of the 
Western Cape, and in farming districts, are different to the city of Cape Town 
(see Seekings, 1995, 1997a; Jacobs, 2001). 
I use two kinds of evidence that have been ignored or unavailable hitherto: 
ward-level results combined with ward-level data from the Population Census; 
and a sample survey of adults across Cape Town.   First, I use ward-level data to 
analyse in what kinds of areas the ANC performed strongly and in what kinds of 
area it did not.  Secondly, I use data from the 2005 Cape Area Study – a survey 
of a representative sample of 1,200 adults across Cape Town – to examine 
which voters supported which parties.  Thirdly, I use data from this sample 
survey to shed some light on changes in the voting behaviour of individual 
voters, probing both the extent of conversion from one party to another and the 
characteristics of such converts. 
Trends in election results in metropolitan Cape Town have been broadly similar 
to those for the province as a whole.  Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show how 
voting has changed in successive elections in the metropolitan area only, i.e. 
omitting votes cast elsewhere in the province.  As Figure 1 shows, the ANC’s 
share of the vote rose steadily across the decade, excepting the dip in the 2000 
local elections.  But the overall rise is less dramatic than in the province as a 
whole (as shown in Table 1), and in Cape Town the ANC failed to win as many 
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votes in 2004 as it had in 1994 (see Figure 2).  The NP’s share of the vote in 
Cape Town plummeted, albeit not as dramatically as in the province as a whole. 
Table 2: Votes for major parties in elections in Cape Town, 1994-2004 
1994 
provincial* 


















DA       375 53 280 27 
DP 107 8 51 7 142 14     
NP/NNP 655 49 358 48 386 37   112 11 
ANC 481 36 278 37 424 41 270 38 454 44 
ID         83 8 
Other 67 5 51 7 88 8 57 8 110 11 
Total 1337 100 738 100 1040 100 702 100 1039 100 
Notes: * estimated    ** PR votes    *** PR + ward votes. 
Figure 1: Number of votes in Cape Town 






































Which areas support which parties? 
Since 2000, Cape Town has been divided into precisely one hundred local 
government wards.  Not only are data available on election results by ward, but 
data from the 2001 Population Census are also available at the ward level.  This 
allows for an analysis of the kinds of area that rally behind each of the parties 
and their candidates in ward elections.3 
A simple inspection of the 2000 local election results in the different wards 
across Cape Town indicates a clear pattern.  Of the sixty-six wards in which 
fewer than 35 percent of the voters were African, the ANC won just one ward.  
(This was ward 48, Rylands, a middle-class Indian and coloured area).  Of the 
seven wards in which between 35 and 70 percent of the voters were African, the 
ANC won five.  And the ANC won every single one of the 27 wards where 
more than 70 percent of the voters were African.  Overall, there is a very strong 
relationship between the racial composition of the electorate and the ANC’s 
share of the vote. 
                                                 
3 Both election results and population census data are available at a higher level of 
disaggregation than wards, but it would be immensely difficult to match up sub-ward voting 
data with sub-ward census data. 



















Table 3: Regression models for ANC’s share of the vote 
Model A Model B Model C 




African voters as % 
of electorate 
0.77*** 0.03   1.14*** 0.09 
Coloured voters as 
% of electorate 
    0.43*** 0.08 
Percentage of adults 
with post-matric 
qualifications 
  2.26*** 0.5 0.35 0.28 





0.0001 -0.00002 0.00006 
Turnout   0.16 0.12 0.12 0.59 
Constant 14*** 1.5 108*** 16 -38*** 14 
r2 0.88 0.66 0.93 
Adjusted r2 0.88 0.65 0.93 
N 97 95 93 
Note: these models are for 97, 95 and 93 wards respectively.  One ward (#76) is omitted 
entirely because the ANC did not contest it, instead supporting a pro-ANC independent 
candidate. 
Table 3 reports the results of a series of models regressing the ANC’s share of 
the vote (as a percentage) against other variables.  Model A regresses the 
ANC’s share against just one other variable: the share of the ward’s adult 
population that is African.  In this simple bivariate regression model, each 
additional percentage point in the African share of the electorate correlates with 
an additional 0.77 percentage points in the ANC’s share of the vote.  The 
correlation is significant at the 1 percent level.  The r2 is a massive 0.88.  This 
reminds us that there is a very strong correlation between race and voting.  But 
in a situation where race and class are also closely correlated, perhaps the 
causation runs from class to voting?  In Model B, the ANC’s share of the vote is 
regressed against four non-racial variables: the percentage of adults with post-
matric education, the employment rate (i.e. the percentage of adults in 
employment or self-employment), the mean household income, and turnout in 
the ward in the local election.  The coefficients for the employment rate and 
mean household income are negative (and highly significant), indicating that 
higher employment and income correlates with a lower ANC vote.  But the 
coefficient on the proportion of adults in the ward having post-matric education 
is positive: controlling for employment and income, post-matric education 
increases the ANC’s share of the vote.  Turnout is not significant.  In this 
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second model, the adjusted r2 is 0.66 – which would normally be considered 
very high, but is much lower than in the bivariate Model A.  Model C uses all of 
the variables, together with a variable for the percentage of coloured voters in 
each ward.  The coefficients for African and coloured voter share are both 
positive (but weakly so in the latter case) and highly significant.  The other 
variables cease to be significant.  The adjusted r2 rises to 0.93.  Comparing 
models A and B suggests that the racial share is the crucial variable: both race 
and class correlate with voting, but race correlates more closely.  Comparing 
models A and C suggests that the addition of other variables besides race does 
little to improve the model (whilst comparing models B and C shows that 
adding race to model B improves the model considerably). 
Taking only the predominantly coloured wards underscores the power of the 
analysis.  For wards in which more than 90 percent of the adults are coloured, 
and excluding one ward where the ANC stood aside to support an ‘independent’ 
candidate, the relationship between mean household income in the ward and the 
ANC’s share of the vote in 2000 is statistically significant (at the 1 percent 
level): the higher the mean household income, the larger the ANC’s share of the 
vote.  And the relationship is reasonably strong. But a bivariate regression gives 
an r2 of just 0.22.  Class explains a part, but only a small part, of the variance in 
voting in predominantly coloured areas. 
These results might seem to provide strong support for the racial census model.  
But the weakness of the racial census model was not that there is no correlation 
between racial demographics and voting shares.  Clearly there is a widespread 
and strong correlation.  The problem is rather different: does correlation indicate 
causation?  Or, to be rather more precise, what is it about a voter’s racial 
classification that explains his or her voting behaviour?  Answering this 
question requires the examination of survey data. 
Which voters support which parties?  Evidence 
from the Cape Area Study 
Surveys have been widely used in examining voting behaviour at the national 
level (see Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996; Mattes, 1995; Mattes, Taylor and 
Africa, 1999).  But publicly-available, national sample surveys rarely have 
samples that are large or representative enough to probe in any detail voting 
behaviour at the provincial or metropolitan level.  The 1993 survey conducted 
by Research Surveys that I used in earlier articles (Seekings, 1996; Eldridge and 
Seekings, 1996) was unusual, in that its sample in the Western Cape was both 
representative and large (n=1282).  Mattes et al. (1996) used a survey conducted 
in February 1994 with a large provincial sample (n=2500).  Ten years later, in 
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early 2005, we conducted a survey in Cape Town that allows us to examine 
again voting behaviour at this level.   
The 2005 Cape Area Study examined a range of topics broadly concerning 
inequality and diversity in post-apartheid Cape Town (see Seekings et al., 
2005).  The survey used a two-stage probabilistic sample design.  The first stage 
– the selection of ‘enumeration areas’ (i.e. the neighbourhoods demarcated as 
discrete areas by Statistics South Africa for the Population Census) – was 
stratified, meaning that the sample in practice comprises four separate samples, 
one in predominantly coloured areas, a second in predominantly white areas, a 
third in predominantly informal, African areas and the last in predominantly 
formal, African areas.  The second stage entailed the selection of households 
within each enumeration area, and of individuals within these households.  As a 
result of differential response rates, the final sample requires weighting for the 
analysis of many issues.  The overall sample comprised 1205 adults. 
Respondents were asked: 
Did you vote in the national elections held last year, in 2004? 
If the respondent answered affirmatively, he or she was then asked: 
I know that voting is a private matter, but I hope you will be able to 
tell me whether, last year, you voted for the African National 
Congress (ANC), for the Democratic Alliance (DA), for the New 
National Party (NNP), for the Independent Democrats (Patricia de 
Lille), for a different party, or did not vote. 
Table 4 show the declared votes of our sample in the 2004 elections and the 
actual results across the city as a whole in 2004.4  Whereas the second column 
presents the distribution of the votes that were actually cast, the third column 
includes also the many adults of voting age who did not vote, either because 
they were not registered to vote or because, even though they were registered, 
they did not bother to vote.  The first and third columns are not strictly 
comparable, because we had a response rate of less than 100 percent and it is 
not unlikely that the kinds of people who do not vote are the kinds of people 
who we failed to interview (either because they were not available or they 
refused).  But comparing the first and last columns suggests that our sample 
                                                 
4 Our sample was in fact drawn from just 55 of the city’s 100 wards.  In six of these wards we 
had only one or two respondents, leaving 49 with nine or more respondents.  These wards 
were not entirely representative of the city.  A comparison of the 2000 local government 
election results in these 49 wards with the results in all 100 wards shows that our sample of 
wards includes a very slightly higher percentage of opposition voters and a smaller 
percentage of ANC voters than in the city as a whole.  But the differences are not large. 
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includes too many self-reported ANC voters and too few self-reported 
opposition party voters.  The most likely explanation for this is that ANC 
supporters were disproportionately likely to say they voted for their party even 
if they did not actually cast a vote in 2004, whilst opposition party voters are 
disproportionately likely to refuse to answer our questions about voting.  This is 
unlikely to make any significant difference to the analysis below of the decision 
about which party to vote for, although it would affect analysis of the decision 
of whether to vote or not. 
Table 4: Comparison of declared voting by CAS sample with actual 
voting results 
Party Declared votes in 









Votes cast and 
estimated non-
voters in 2004 
 
(%) 
Democratic Alliance 10 27 13 
New National Party 5 11 5 
African National Congress 39 44 21 
Independent Democrats 3 8 4 
Other 3 11 5 
refused 11   
Did not vote 28  51 
Cannot remember 2   
Total 100 100 100 
Note: The final column is based on an eligible voting population in 2004 of 2.13 million 
voters.  This figure was extrapolated from the 2001 Population Census data for Cape Town, 
assuming that the annual growth in the adult population between 2001 and 2004 was the 
same as between 1996 and 2001 (i.e. 3 percent per year). 
The Cape Town survey data can be used to explore the relevance of competing 
theories of voting behaviour. The three predominant approaches focus on 
partisan identification, issues and sociological factors.  Partisan identification 
refers to the enduring psychological identification of citizens with parties, 
formed over long periods of time (often in adolescence).  Issue-voting refers to 
voters’ making decisions on the basis of a retrospective or prospective 
assessment of the competing parties’ performance on key issues.  Sociological 
explanations focus on variables such as race or class, which can affect voting 
behaviour through a variety of mechanisms (including partisan identification or 
issue-voting). 
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In South Africa, the ‘racial census’ view of elections was a rather poorly 
developed version of a sociological explanation.  A more thorough-going 
sociological explanation would entail analysis of class as well as race, and of 
the interaction between these in the formation of identities and interests.  Table 
5 shows that a variety of sociological factors correlate with voting decisions in 
Cape Town.  Unsurprisingly, African voters massively favour the ANC.  But 
there is a clear and strong correlation also between household and 
neighbourhood income and voting, as well as a weaker correlation between 
education and voting. 
Table 5: Declared voting by race, income, education and gender (%) 









white 4 29 6 2 3 24 29 3 100 
Coloured 20 10 8 5 4 40 10 3 100 
Race 
African 83 0 0 0 1 15 1 0 100 
Rich 18 19 4 4 5 33 15 2 100 
Middle-
income 
39 11 8 2 2 31 6 2 100 
Household 
income 
Poor 62 6 4 1 2 21 3 1 100 
Rich 17 19 6 3 2 29 21 2 100 
Middle-
income 
35 7 6 3 4 37 6 2 100 
Neighbour-
hood 
poor 76 2 2 1 1 15 2 1 100 
Post-
matric 
22 17 2 3 2 28 22 2 100 




45 8 6 2 2 26 8 2 100 
Male 37 9 4 3 4 29 13 1 100 Gender 
Female 40 11 6 2 2 27 10 2 100 
Note: The survey asked a series of questions about racial classification; the analyses reported 
in this and subsequent tables use the variable f5, how were you classified under apartheid? 
In the 1990s, there was a relationship between class and voting among coloured 
voters (as among Indian voters in KwaZulu-Natal), with richer coloured voters 
disproportionately likely to vote for the ANC and poorer coloured voters 
disproportionately unlikely to do so (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Habib and 
Naidu, 1999).  We found a rather more complex pattern in 2005 (see Table 6).  
Coloured respondents in rich and poor households were more likely to say they 
voted for the ANC than respondents in middle-income households.  This might 
reflect the difficult choices facing poor coloured voters in the aftermath of the 
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collapse of the NNP.  The DA does not provide a comparable home to poor 
voters.  Coloured men were also more likely to vote for the ANC than coloured 
women. 
Table 6: Declared voting by income, education and gender, coloured 
voters only (%) 









Coloured total 20 10 8 5 4 40 10 3 100 
Rich 27 9 5 6 5 38 6 4 100 
Middle-
income 
13 14 13 4 3 46 6 2 100 
Household 
income 
Poor 26 15 9 3 4 36 5 3 100 




19 12 9 7 2 36 15 1 100 
Male 25 9 8 5 6 36 10 2 100 Gender 
Female 17 11 9 4 2 42 11 4 100 
The complexities of voting in Cape Town provide an obvious complication to a 
crude racial census interpretation (see Eldridge and Seekings, 1996).  But a 
more fundamental challenge to sociological interpretations in general arose 
from an examination of partisan identification in South Africa (Mattes, 1995; 
Seekings, 1996b; see also Seekings, 1997b).  Many South African voters, like 
voters in other polities with well-established party systems, had deep-rooted 
attachments to the ANC or, far less commonly, one of the other parties.  But 
explaining voting behaviour in terms of pre-existing identification begs the 
question, ‘what determines identification?’  Mattes et al. (1999) developed a 
simple model that explained identification and voting behaviour at the national 
level without recourse to race or other ‘structural’ (i.e. sociological) variables.  
They found that a battery of purely attitudinal variables explained why most 
voters either identified with the ANC or identified with a competing party or, if 
they identified with no party, for which party they said they would vote.  The 
attitudinal variables used included views on the competing parties and 
assessments of their past and prospective performance. 
CAS 2005 was not designed as a study of voting behaviour.  We did not ask our 
respondents directly why they voted the ways they did, nor did we ask a large 
number of attitudinal questions allowing us to replicate the modeling of Mattes 
et al. (1999).  But we did ask a number of questions about our respondents’ 
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grievances and assessments of different levels of government, allowing for 
some analysis of voters’ reasoning. 
We found the expected level and pattern of partisan identification in Cape 
Town, with high levels of identification among African respondents but much 
lower levels among coloured and white respondents.  Three out of four African 
respondents identified with a political party, almost all with the ANC.  Only one 
in five coloured respondents identified with a political party, and fewer than one 
in six white respondents.  Strikingly, most of the coloured party identifiers 
identified with the ANC.  Even one in five white party identifiers identified with 
the ANC (with three in five identifying with the DA).  Overall, 80 percent of 
our partisan identifiers identified with the ANC, and less than 10 percent 
identified with the DA.  If identifiers are more likely to vote than non-
identifiers, then it would follow that low turnout in all areas would favour the 
ANC. 
Responses to our questions about issues were also much as we expected.  Half 
of our respondents identified job creation and unemployment as the most 
important problem that the government should address.   One-fifth identified 
crime as the most important problem.  Few respondents singled out any other 
issue.  Differences by race were muted: white respondents were somewhat more 
likely to mention crime, but there were some African and coloured respondents 
who did likewise and even among white respondents, jobs were mentioned 
more often than crime. 
Table 7 reports the results of a series of probit regressions on voting for the 
ANC in 2004 as opposed to voting for any other party.  The dependent variable 
is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent voted for the ANC and 
a value of 0 if he or she said that he or she voted for any other party.  No 
account is taken of respondents who refused to say for which party they voted, 
or who said that they did not vote.   
In Model A, voting for the ANC is regressed simply against the racial 
classification of the voter.  Being African increases the probability of voting for 
the ANC by 83 percent, and being coloured increases it by 29 percent.  Just 
knowing the racial classification of the respondent explains half of the variance 
in the dependent variable.  Model B regresses voting for the ANC against a set 
of other structural or sociological variables, omitting race.  The average income 
in the neighbourhood and the income of the household are both highly 
significant.  Living in a rich neighbourhood or household reduces considerably 
the probability of voting for the ANC.  But this model explains much less of the 
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Table 7: Probit regression models for voting for the ANC compared to voting for any other party 

























African 0.83*** 0.03         0.5*** 0.09 
Coloured 0.29*** 0.05         0.15*** 0.05 
Male   -0.01 0.04         
Post-matric education   0.01 0.06         
Matric   0.06 0.05         
Rich neighbourhood   -0.53*** 0.05     -0.4*** 0.06 -0.08 0.06 
Middle-income neighbourhood   -0.32*** 0.06     -0.19*** 0.06 -0.05 0.05 
Rich household   -0.26*** 0.06         
Middle-income household   -0.15*** 0.06         
Identify with the ANC     0.64*** 0.03   0.52*** 0.03 0.38*** 0.05 
Assess Mbeki’s performance as 
good 
      0.26*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.04 0.12*** 0.04 
Assess Rasool’s performance as 
good 
      -0.04 0.05     
Trust Mbeki to do what is right       0.14*** 0.05     
Trust Rasool to do what is right       -0.18*** 0.05 0.1*** 0.03 0.07** 0.03 
Understands politics       -0.16*** 0.05     
Most important problem is crime       -0.18*** 0.06     
Most important problem is jobs       0.00 0.04     
Pseudo r2  0.51 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.57 0.66 
N 676 603 711 687 708 673 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1 percent (0.01) level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent (0.05) level.
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variance in the dependent variable than did Model A.  Model C regresses the 
voting decision against identification with the ANC.  Unsurprisingly, the 
correlation is strong and highly significant.  Model D regresses voting for the 
ANC against a set of attitudinal variables, with some of the correlations being 
highly significant but others not being significant even at the 10 percent level.  
But, as with Model B, this model explains only a small part of the variance in 
the dependent variable.  Model E combines a variety of structural and attitudinal 
variables, but omits race.  The neighbourhood, partisan identification, 
assessment of President Mbeki’s performance and trust in Premier Rasool are 
all highly significant, and explain more of the variance in the dependent variable 
than did race alone in Model A.  This shows that, as Mattes et al. (1999) argued, 
much of the voting decision can be explained without recourse to race, even if 
there is a strong correlation between race and voting.  Finally, Model F adds 
race, which results in neighbourhood ceasing to be significant and the other 
coefficients shrinking.  This model explains more of the variance in the 
dependent variable than any of the other models. 
In summary, race is clearly a more powerful factor in explaining voting 
behaviour than other structural or sociological factors or attitudinal variables on 
their own.  But it is no more powerful than partisan identification or a 
combination of other sociological and attitudinal variables.  And the most 
complete explanation of voting behaviour needs to include some of these other 
variables alongside race. 
Changing voters or different voters? 
The 2005 Cape Area Study is, to my knowledge, the first survey to ask people 
how they voted in several elections.  Before being asked about the 2004 
elections, respondents were asked:  
South Africa’s first democratic elections were held in 1994.  I know 
that voting is a private matter, but I hope you will be able to tell me 
whether, in 1994, you voted for Nelson Mandela and the African 
National Congress, for FW De Klerk and the National Party, for the 
Democratic Party, for a different party, or you did not vote. 
The survey thus provides data on respondents’ reported voting behaviour in two 
elections, in 1994 and 2004, i.e. ten years apart.  Whilst recall over a long time 
period is problematic, we hoped that the founding elections were sufficiently 
pivotal that respondents would remember how they had voted. 
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The CAS data allows us to examine who voted – or at least who says they voted 
– for each party in 1994 and 2004.  We can then see how many voters changed 
their vote, and identify who were these voters.  We should note that the wording 
of the question above was not strictly party-based because it refers explicitly to 
Mandela and De Klerk.  It is possible that this wording might lead some 
respondents to answer “ANC” because of post-hoc identification with Mandela.   
Tables 8 and 9 compare respondents’ recorded vote in 1994 with their votes in 
2004.  Note that, given that mistakes might be made either by the respondent or 
the interviewer, the margin of error must be at least a few percentage points, 
meaning that small percentages should be treated with caution.  The patterns of 
results are, however, very striking.  The first column of Table 8 shows that the 
ANC retained in 2004 almost all (82 percent) of the votes of those respondents 
who said that they voted for it in the 1994 elections.  Some (11 percent) of its 
1994 voters said that they did not vote in 2004.  Although the first figure is 
almost certainly an overestimate and the second an underestimate, because the 
proportion of our African respondents who said that they voted was much larger 
than the proportion of people in African areas who actually did vote in 2004, the 
pattern is clear.  Very few (only 7 percent) of the ANC’s 1994 voters said that 
they defected to a different party in 2004.  The third column of Table 8 shows 
that the DA also retained almost all the votes of 1994 DP voters.  In complete 
contrast, as shown in the second column of Table 8, the NNP retained the 
support in 2004 of a mere quarter (26 percent) of its declared 1994 voters.  
About the same proportion of its 1994 voters (28 percent) voted for the DA in 
2004, and a similar proportion said that they did not vote at all in 2004.  Small 
proportions defected to the ANC (7 percent), ID (6 percent) or other parties.  
Overall, whilst there is clear evidence of voters shifting from the NP to the DA 
and from the NP to not voting, there is little evidence of voters shifting from 
other parties to the ANC. 
Some of the respondents in our 2005 survey were not living in Cape Town in 
1994.  About 8 percent of our respondents moved to Cape Town since 2000, 
and another 14 percent moved to Cape Town during the 1990s (but we cannot 
tell whether this was before or after the April 1994 elections).  Three-quarters of 
these new arrivals are African, almost all from the Eastern Cape.  As many as 
27 percent of our respondents who said they had actually voted in 2004 had 
arrived in Cape Town after 1990, and 86 percent of these say they voted for the 
ANC in 2004.  In short, immigration into Cape Town of ANC-supporting voters 
from ANC-supporting areas massively boosted the ANC’s vote.  The ANC also 
benefited from the new age cohorts reaching voting age.  Some of the recent 
immigrants into Cape Town were too young to have voted in 1994.  But the 
ageing of the younger age cohort that was already in Cape Town also benefited 
the ANC.  Of those of our respondents who were too young to have voted in 
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1994 but were living in Cape Town before 1990, just over half said that they did 
not vote in 2004; of the just under half who did vote in 2004, a majority voted 
for the ANC.  If we combine all of the younger voters, i.e. those who were 
already in Cape Town and those who immigrated after 1990, then the ANC won 
four out of five of the votes actually cast in 2004. 
Table 8: How voters voted in 2004, according to their vote in 1994 
(unweighted) 






















ANC 82 7 2 9 40 24 
NNP 1 26 2 3 2 1 
DA 3 28 79 23 6 3 
ID 2 6 4 6 1 4 
Other 1 3 2 40 1 1 







total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The 2004 votes exclude ‘refused’ and ‘don’t know’.  Possible mistaken responses or 
recording of responses means that small numbers should be treated with caution. 
Table 9: How voters voted in 1994, according to their vote in 2004 











Mandela/ANC 68 5 9 33 13 
De Klerk/NP 2 72 35 30 14 
DP 0 2 32 3 2 
Other 1 2 6 7 2 
Not vote (age 
eligible) 
6 2 2 13 23 
Not vote (too 
young) 
22 7 12 10 39 
Refuse / don’t 
know 








total 100 100 100 100 100 
Overall, of the ANC’s 2004 voters, more than one fifth had been too young to 
vote in 1994 and an additional proportion, approximately, were old enough to 
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have voted in 1994 but had not been living in Cape Town then.  Only one-
twentieth had converted from other parties.  In short, the ANC’s rising share of 
the vote owed more to demographic change than it did to conversions. 
Table 9 shows that the DA support base included many former NP voters, 
whilst the ID supporters were drawn in more or less equal proportions from 
former ANC and NP voters.  Defections from the ANC were far more important 
to the DA and ID than defections from all other parties to the ANC.  Insofar as 
individual voters have shifted from one party to another, most of the shifts were 
between opposition parties, and there were more shifts away from the ANC to 
opposition parties than from the opposition parties to the ANC.  Although the 
numbers are small, it seems that the ANC’s gains were accomplished despite a 
net loss through voter defection. 
The rise in votes for the ANC cannot be explained simply in terms of 
demographic change in the electorate.  As we saw above, the ANC’s rising 
share of the vote did not reflect a rising number of votes.  The ANC gained 
ground in terms of shares of the vote because it did not lose votes to the same 
extent as the opposition parties, most especially the NP.  This brings us back to 
the issue of turnout. 
Turnout can be analysed using both ward- and voter-level data.  The most 
readily available ward level data comes from the 2000 local government 
elections, when the DA performed relatively strongly and the ANC relatively 
weakly.  Regressing turnout by ward against neighbourhood income shows that 
the latter had a significant and positive effect in 2000.5  The relationship 
becomes insignificant, however, when variables are included for the racial 
composition of the ward.  For each additional 1 percent of the ward population 
that is African, turnout in 2000 declined by one quarter of a percentage point.  
For each additional 1 percent of the ward population that is coloured, turnout 
declined by one third of a percentage point.  In 2000, turnout is sensitive to 
racial composition above all, with the addition of other ‘class’ variables making 
little difference to the regression.  Care must be taken when using individual-
level data from, for example, CAS, because of suspicions that some reported 
ANC voters might not have actually voted in 2004.  Taking the responses at 
face value suggests that party identifiers are much more likely to vote, being 
coloured reduces the probability of voting, whilst there is no significant 
relationship between being African and voting (but this last finding should be 
viewed with suspicion). 
                                                 
5 These regressions exclude one ward where turnout was very much higher than 100 percent. 
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Conclusion 
Post-apartheid politics in Cape Town (and the Western Cape) has never been 
boring.  It has been the primary site of decline of the NP and rise of the DA.  It 
has seen considerable ‘floor-crossing’ by municipal councilors, provincial 
legislators and members of the national parliament.  The city and province have 
seen a bewildering succession of mayors and premiers.  And both the DA and 
ANC have been wracked by deep division.  Neither political parties nor the 
party system seem very stable. 
There have been some important shifts in voter allegiance.  Most importantly, 
the NP has retained fewer of its 1994 voters than it lost to the DA, and the ID 
has attracted former NP and ANC voters.  But, overall, there has been little 
movement from the ANC to the opposition parties or visa-versa.  The failure of 
the ANC to attract substantial numbers of former NP (or DP/DA) voters, despite 
having coloured provincial leaders, suggests that there has been little 
deracialisation of the electorate in this city. 
The ANC’s gains since 1994 have not been due to a successful recruitment from 
the ranks of opposition party voters.  Rather, they have been due to 
demographic changes and differential turnout (with the 2000 local government 
elections representing an exception to the general trend of low turnout among 
non-ANC voters).  In 1994, Reynolds suggested that racial demographics were 
crucial to the provincial result, and ‘the prospects for the ANC in the Cape may 
well improve as the century draws to a close, with the continuing influx of black 
South Africans into the townships and squatter camps of Cape Town’ (1994: 
204).   Reynolds was right.  Massive immigration into Cape Town of ANC-
supporters from ANC-supporting areas, mostly in the Eastern Cape, together 
with the preponderance of ANC supporters among younger age cohorts 
reaching voting age, has massively swelled the ANC’s vote.   
Demographics dictate that elections in Cape Town (and the Western Cape) 
continue to turn on the ‘coloured vote’, but this is slowly changing.  During 
most of the apartheid period, only 10 percent of Cape Town’s population was 
African.  At current rates of demographic change, Cape Town will have a 
majority African electorate by about 2012.  This does not mean that Cape Town 
is guaranteed to deliver an ANC majority before or by 2012.  Turnout remains 
crucial, although there are no signs that African voters are becoming apathetic 
or disinterested any faster than others.  More importantly, opposition parties 
might break the mould of the first ten years of post-apartheid politics and recruit 
significant numbers of former ANC voters.  But if current voting patterns 
persist, demographic change will deliver Cape Town and the Western Cape to 
the ANC without any need for floor-crossing or bizarre political coalitions. 
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